We consider a quantum polynomial-time algorithm which solves the discrete logarithm problem for points on elliptic curves over GF (2 m ). We improve over earlier algorithms by constructing an efficient circuit for multiplying elements of binary finite fields and by representing elliptic curve points using a technique based on projective coordinates. The depth of our proposed implementation is O(m 2 ), which is an improvement over the previous bound of O(m 3 ).
Introduction
Quantum computing [1] has the ability to solve problems whose best classical solutions are considered inefficient. Perhaps the best-known example is Shor's polynomial-time integer factorization algorithm [2] , where the best known classical technique, the General Number Field Sieve, has superpolynomial complexity exp O( 3 n log 2 n) in the number of bits n [3] . Since a hardware implementation of this algorithm on a suitable quantum mechanical system could be used to crack the RSA cryptosystem [3] , these results force researchers to rethink the assumptions of classical cryptography and to consider optimized circuits for the two main parts of Shor's factorization algorithm: the quantum Fourier transform [1, 4] and modular exponentiation [5] . Quantum noise and issues of scalability in quantum information processing proposals require circuit designers to consider optimization carefully.
Since the complexity of breaking RSA is subexponential, cryptosystems such as Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) have become increasingly popular. The best known classical attack on ECC requires an exponential search with complexity O(2 n/2 ). The difference is substantial: a 256-bit ECC key requires the same effort to break as a 3072-bit RSA key. The largest publicly broken ECC system has a key length of 109 bits [6] , while the key lengths of 1024 bits and higher are strongly recommended for RSA. ECC has been recently acknowledged by National Security Agency as a secure protocol and included in their Suite B [7] . Most ECC implementations are built over GF (2 m ). Software implementations, such as ECC over GF (2 155 ), are also publicly available [8] .
However, there does exist a quantum polynomial-time algorithm that cracks elliptic curve cryptography [9] . As with Shor's factorization algorithm, this algorithm should be studied in detail by anyone interested in studying the threat posed by quantum computing to ECC. The quantum algorithm for solving discrete logarithm problems in cyclic groups such as the one used in ECC requires computing sums and products of finite field elements, such as GF (2 m ) [10] . Addition in GF (2 m ) requires only a depth-1 circuit consisting of parallel CNOT gates [11] . We present a depth O(m) multiplication circuit for GF (2 m ) based on the construction by Mastrovito [12] . Previously, a depth O(m 2 ) circuit was given in [11] .
In Section 2 we give an overview of quantum computation, GF (2 m ) field arithmetic, and elliptic curve arithmetic. Section 3 outlines the quantum algorithm, and presents our improvements: the GF (2 m ) multiplication circuit, and projective coordinate representation. The paper concludes with some observations and suggestions for further research.
Preliminaries
We will be working in the quantum circuit model, where data is stored in qubits and unitary operations are applied to various qubits at discrete time steps as quantum gates. We assume that any set of non-intersecting gates may be applied within one time step. The total number of time steps required to execute an algorithm as a circuit is the depth. Further details on quantum computation in the circuit model can be found in [1] .
We will make use of the CNOT and Toffoli gates. The CNOT gate is defined as the unitary operator which performs the transformation |a |b → |a |a ⊕ b . The Toffoli gate [13] can be described as a controlled CNOT gate, and performs the transformation over the computational basis given by the formula |a |b |c → |a |b |c ⊕ ab .
Binary Field Arithmetic
The finite field GF (2 m ) consists of a set of 2 m elements, with an addition and multiplication operation, and additive and multiplicative identities 0 and 1, respectively. GF (2 m ) forms a commutative ring over these two operations where each non-zero element has a multiplicative inverse. The finite field GF (2 m ) is unique up to isomorphism.
We can represent the elements of GF (2 m ) where m ≥ 2 with the help of an irreducible primitive polynomial of the form [14] . The finite field GF (2 m ) is isomorphic to the set of polynomials over GF (2) modulo P (x). In other words, elements of GF (2 m ) can be represented as polynomials over GF (2) of degree at most m − 1, where the product of two elements is the product of their polynomial representations, reduced modulo P (x) [14, 15] . As the sum of two polynomials is simply the bitwise XOR of the coefficients, it is convenient to express these polynomials as bit vectors of length m. Additional properties of finite fields can be found in [14] .
Mastrovito has proposed an algorithm along with a classical circuit implementation for polynomial basis (PB) multiplication [12, 16] , popularly known as the Mastrovito multiplier. Based on Mastrovito algorithm, [15] presents a formulation of PB multiplication and a generalized parallel-bit hardware architecture for special types of primitive polynomials, namely trinomials, equally spaced polynomials (ESPs), and two classes of pentanomials.
Consider the inputs a and b, with a = [a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a m−1 ] T and b = [b 0 , b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b m−1 ] T , where the coordinates a i and b i , 0 ≤ i < m, are the coefficients of two polynomials A(x) and B(x) representing representing two elements of GF (2 m ) with respect to a primitive polynomial P (x). We use three matrices in this construction:
1. an m × (m − 1) reduction matrix Q, 2. an m × m lower triangular matrix L, and 3. an (m − 1) × m upper triangular matrix U .
We define vectors d and e as:
where L and U are defined as
Note that d and e correspond to polynomials D(x) and E(x) such that
Using P (x), we may construct a matrix Q which converts the coefficients of any polynomial x m E(x) to the coefficients of an equivalent polynomial modulo P (x) with degree less than m. Thus, the vector
gives the coefficients of the polynomial representing the product of a and b. The construction of the matrix Q, which is dependent on the primitive polynomial P (x), is given in [15] .
Elliptic Curve Groups
In the most general case, we define an elliptic curve over a field F as the set of points (x, y) ∈ F × F which satisfy the equation
By extending this curve to the projective plane, we may include the point at infinity O as an additional solution. By defining a suitable addition operation, we may interpret the points of an elliptic curve as an Abelian group, with O as the identity element.
In the specific case of the finite field GF (2 m ), it is possible to reduce the degrees of freedom in the coefficients defining the elliptic curve by the use of linear transformations on the variables x and y. In addition, it was shown in [17] that for a class of elliptic curves called supersingular curves, it is possible to reduce the discrete logarithm problem for the elliptic curve group to a discrete logarithm problem over a finite field in such a way that makes such curves unsuitable for cryptography. For GF (2 m ), these correspond to elliptic curves with parameter a 1 = 0. We will restrict our attention to non-supersingular curves over GF (2 m ), which are of the form
The set of points over an elliptic curve also forms an Abelian group with O as the identity element. For a non-supersingular curve over GF (2 m ), the group operation is defined in the following manner. Given a point P = (x 1 , y 1 ) on the curve, we define (−P ) as (x 1 , x 1 + y 1 ). Given a second point Q = (x 2 , y 2 ), where P = ±Q, we define the sum P + Q as the point ( identity element. Finally, scalar multiplication by an integer can be easily defined in terms of repeated addition or subtraction.
The elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) is defined as the problem of retrieving a constant scalar d given that Q = dP for known points P and Q. With this definition, we may define cryptographic protocols using the ECDLP by modifying analogous protocols using the discrete logarithm problem over finite fields.
Quantum Polynomial-Time Attack
With a reversible implementation for the basic elliptic curve group operations, it is possible to solve the ECDLP with a polynomial-depth quantum circuit. Given a base point P and some scalar multiple Q = dP on an elliptic curve over GF (2 m ), Shor's algorithm for discrete logarithms [2] constructs the state
|x |y |xP + yQ , then performs a two-dimensional quantum Fourier transform over the first two registers. It was shown in [9] that this task can be reduced to adding a classically known point to a superposition of points.
Linear-Depth Circuit for GF (2 m ) Multiplication
We now discuss how to implement multiplication over GF (2 m ) as a quantum circuit. We perform the following steps: We illustrate the above steps with an example using P (x) = x 4 + x + 1.
1. Expressions for d and e derived from equations (1-2) are shown below.
We also construct the matrix Q =
From (3), we compute the multiplier output
2. We first compute e 0 , e 1 , and e 2 in the ancilla, as shown in Figure 1 (gates 1-6). 3. We next implement the matrix transformation Qe (gates 7-9). 4. Finally, we compute the coefficients d i , 0 ≤ i < m, and add them to the ancilla to compute c (gates [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] .
At this point, we have a classical reversible circuit which implements the transformation |a |b |0 → |a |b |a · b . However, if we input a superposition of field elements, then the output register will be entangled with the input. If one of the inputs, such as |b is classically known, then we may also obtain b −1 classically. Since we may construct a circuit which maps |a · b b −1 |0 → |a · b b −1 |a , we may apply the inverse of this circuit to the output of the first circuit to obtain |a |b |a · b → |0 |b |a · b using an ancilla set to b −1 . This gives us a quantum circuit which takes a quantum input |a and classical input |b , and outputs |a · b |b . When |b is not a classical input, the output of the circuit may remain entangled with the input, and other techniques may be required to remove this entanglement. However, we emphasize that this is not required for a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for the ECDLP [9] .
This technique can be applied for any primitive polynomial P (x). In some circumstances, we may derive exact expressions for the number of gates required. Lemma 1. A binary field multiplier for primitive polynomial P (x) can be designed using at most 2m 2 − 1 gates. If P (x) is a trinomial or an allone polynomial, where each coefficient is 1, we require only m 2 + m − 1 gates.
Proof. There are three phases to the computation: computing e, computing Qe, and adding d to the result. For e and d, each pair of coefficients which are multiplied and then added to another qubit requires one Toffoli gate. This requires
gates respectively, for a total of m 2 gates. Now, we consider the implementation of the transformation Q.
In general, m 2 − 1 CNOT gates suffice for any linear reversible computation defined by the matrix Q in equation (3) [18] . This gives a general upper bound of 2m 2 − 1 gates. In the specific case of the All-One-Polynomial, the operation Q consists of adding e 1 to each of the other qubits, requiring m−1 CNOT operations. This gives a total of m 2 +m−1 operations.
For a trinomial, we have a primitive polynomial P (x) = x m + x k + 1 for some constant k such that 1 ≤ k < m. To upper bound the number of gates required to implement Q, we may consider the inverse operation, in which we begin with a polynomial of degree at most m−1, and we wish to find an equivalent polynomial where each term has degree between m − 1 and 2m − 2. Increasing the minimum degree of a polynomial requires one CNOT operation, and this must be done m − 1 times. Again, this gives a total of m 2 + m − 1 operations.
Parallelization
We construct a parallelized version of this network by considering the three parts of the computation: e, Qe and adding d. For e and d, note that given coefficients a i and b j where the value of i − j is fixed, the target qubit of each separate term a i b j is different. This means that they may be performed in parallel. In the case of e, we evaluate a i b j whenever i + j ≥ m. This means that the values of i − j may range from −(m − 2) to m − 2, giving a depth 2m − 3 circuit for finding e. Similarly, for d, we evaluate a i b j whenever i + j < m. The values of i − j range from −(m − 1) to m − 1, giving a depth 2m − 1 circuit.
To compute Qe, at most m 2 − 1 CNOT gates are used. In [18] , it is shown that such a computation can be done in a linear number of stages, with a depth of 6m + O(1). This gives us a total depth of 10m + O(1) for the multiplication circuit. An implementation which replaces the Toffoli gate with 1-and 2-qubit gates requires a circuit depth of 26m + O(1).
Projective Representation
When points on an elliptic curve are represented as affine coordinates (x, y), performing group operations on such points requires finding the multiplicative inverse of elements of GF (2 m ). This operation takes much longer to perform than the other field operations required, and it is desirable to minimize the number of division operations. For example, [19] gives a quantum circuit of depth O(m 2 ) which uses the extended Euclidean algorithm.
By using projective coordinate representation, we can perform group operations without division. Instead of using two elements of GF (2 m ) to represent a point, we use three elements, (X, Y, Z) to represent the point ( X Z , Y Z ) in affine coordinates. Dividing X and Y by a certain quantity is now equivalent to multiplying the third coordinate (Z) by this quantity. Extensions to this concept have also been explored, where different information about an elliptic curve point is stored in several coordinates. Another advantage to projective coordinates is that the point at infinity O can simply be represented by setting Z to zero. Unfortunately, one issue with projective coordinates for reversible computing is that there are more than one representation for any particular point.
To represent the point (x, y), we use the equal superposition of all of these representations
We construct this state by starting with the state 1/ √ 2 m z |z |z |z , and multiplying the first and second registers by x and y, respectively.
Exact formulas for point addition in projective coordinates can be easily derived by taking the formulas for the affine coordinates under a common denominator and multiplying the Z coordinate by this denominator. These are detailed in [20] . Since the ECDLP can be solved by implementing elliptic curve point addition where one point is "classically known" [9] , we may implement these formulas using the multiplication algorithm presented in Section 3.1 and by being careful to uncompute any temporary registers used. Since the number of multiplication operations used in these formulas is fixed, we may implement elliptic curve point addition with a known classical point with a linear depth circuit. This represents an improvement on the algorithm of [19] , which makes use of an O(m 2 )-depth circuit for inversion of GF (2 m ) field elements.
Finally, to construct the state required for solving the ECDLP, we use the standard "double and add" technique, which requires implementing the point addition circuit for each value 2 i P and 2 i Q, where 0 ≤ i < m. Performing 2m instances of a linear depth circuit, followed by a quantum Fourier transform gives a final depth complexity of O(m 2 ) for the circuit which solves the ECDLP over GF (2 m ). This improves the previously known upper bound of O(m 3 ) [9] .
